Spaceflight Center (responsible for the booster) could not
agree on how much crossrange the shuttle really would need, so the contractors were asked to design both 370 km-crossrange straight-wing and 2700 km-crossrange delta- wing versions of the orbiter.Three consortiums initially submitted bids: Lockheed/Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas/Martin Marietta, and North American Rockwell / General Dynamics. Grumman later submitted a fourth bid. NASA expected
to award two three 11-month contracts worth $8 mi lion each, before launching a full-scale "phase C/D" effort to develop the shuttle by 1977. But unexpected budget cuts soon forced the agency
to
delay the schedule.
Boeing/Lockheed Phase B delta-wing shuttle concept. The booster would be 64m long and powered by 11 rocket engines while the 352.9-tonne delta-wing orbiter would be 50.3m long with a cross range capability of 2,400 km. The Air Force regarded Maxime Faget's straight-wing orbiter as outright dangerous since its flight plan canceled for a stall maneuver at 12.2 km altitude followed by a controlled dive to 7.6 km to pick up speed again.
This was necessary because the shuttle would be reentering nose-high and it would be travelling too slowly for the wings to provide any lift when the nose finally gets pushed down. The Air Force (and leading NASA/MSFC officials such as Dale Myers) preferred a delta wing which would permit a normal gliding reentry. The delta provides better trim and drag across the entire flight path, from hypersonic reentry
to
subsonic flight, although the landing speed wi l be higher than for a straight-wing. Faget objected that the delta would be heavier, although it did offer more room for the landing gear. What settled the argument in the end was the USAF cross range requirement since the shuttle would have to capable of overflying the Soviet Union and return to base after a single orbit, only 90 minutes later. Due to the Earth's rotation, the base would have moved by 2000 km in 90 minutes so this defined the shuttle's crossrange requirement.
But NASA paid a heavy price for this, since the resulting additional weight and complexity added well over 20% to both development and operations costs of the shuttle. To the Air Force, the only shuttle capability that seemed really valuable was the ability to inspect and retrieve satellites in space as well as deploy 18,144 kg military spy satellites. NASA had no choice, though, since it badly needed the considerable US Air Force space traffic to boost the shuttle "market"
-- the basic justification for the extremely high initial investment of the system. As the space station project was postponed indefinitely in mid-1970, it became increasingly clear that one-third of the shuttle payloads would be military satellites. NASA also needed USAF political support in Congress, where influential Senators and Representatives were adamantly opposed to Paine's grandiose and expensive post-Apollo space exploration plan.
The Department of Defense was, at best, a lukewarm shuttle supporter and there was little military interest in a low- cost space transportation system since the existing Titan and Atlas rockets were quite sufficient for USAF needs. It was not even interested in sharing the cost with NASA.
The Department of Defense was, at best, a lukewarm shuttle supporter and there was little military interest in a low- cost space transportation system since the existing Titan and Atlas rockets were quite sufficient for USAF needs. It was not even interested in sharing the cost with NASA.
"Spaceflight and Rocketry -- a Chronology", David Baker:, Facts on File Inc, 1996, ISBN 0-8160-1853-7 "The Space Shuttle Decision" -- T.A. Heppenheimer, NASA History Office, NASA SP-4221, 1999
